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The Expanding Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Sherman Antitrust
Act: Intent and Effects in the
Balance?
"It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends
on several rather startling propositions. In the first place the acts
causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states.
It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the
[Sherman Act]."
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355
(1908).
"A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the
Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs
in foreign countries."
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 704 (1962).
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic competition and warfare between states are facts of
life' in a global community of independent and sovereign na-
tions.2 Both strong and weak nations resort to their use. 3  The scope
of economic competition includes the independent nation's right to
regulate foreign commerce, a historical right recognized by interna-
tional law as the sovereign prerogative of nation states:
Individual nations have historically regulated imports by imposing
1. Lillich, The Status of Economic Coercion Under International Law: United
Nations Norms, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17, 17 (1977).
2. Lillich suggests that economic competition between sovereign states became an
international reality following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Id. The Peace, which
ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, recognized the full sovereignty of over 300 German
principalities within the Holy Roman Empire, the complete independence of the Dutch
Republic, and the Swiss liberation from the Hapsburgs. The political and territorial con-
sequences of the Peace were the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of
numerous sovereign nation states competing within the new European economic community.
28 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 672-73 (1963).
3. Parry, Defining Economic Coercion in International Law, 12 Ex. INT'L L.J. 1, 4
(1977).
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tariffs, inspections, quantitative and qualitative restrictions, and
numerous other conditions and barriers to international trade. They
have frequently regulated exports as well, including, recently,
complete cut-offs where deemed necessary to retain adequate do-
mestic supply without inflation.
4
A sovereign state's subjective determination to employ various
methods of economic competition and restrictive trade practices may
detrimentally affect the social, economic and political well-being of
other nation states. The question arises whether these nations should
be held accountable for this conduct by an objective stand-
ard.5 Historically, few organizations have been capable of making
such objective determinations. 6  Attempts to regulate global restric-
tive trade practices through international regulatory bodies have met
with little practical success.7 The most common problem in this area
is the lack of a universal consensus on such objective standards for
antitrust enforcement.8 Thus, despite international agreement that
4. Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & Ec. 187, 192 (1974),
reprinted in Lillich, supra note 1.
5. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245, 254
(1976).
6. Id. Examples of limited mechanisms that can make objective determinations
include: the United Nations Security Counsel, which claims exclusive jurisdiction over
serious forms of coercive economic measures, Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (art. 17, para. 2 of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151, ad hoc bodies with the
authority to intervene in transactions governed by treaty, Bowett, supra note 5 at 254, and
internal dispute settlement procedures contained in commercial treaties.
7. Triggs, Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Legislation: The Inter-
national Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegation of a Uranium Producers' Cartel,
12 MELB. U.L. REV. 250, 257 (1979). Early attempts included the 1948 drafting of the
Havana Charter for International Trade Organizations to create international legal rules and
institutional mechanisms to control restrictive trade practices. See United States Department
of State, Havana Charter for International Trade Organization, 23-140 (1948); Draft Re-
strictive Business Practices Convention 1953, reprinted in 2 METZGER, LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 1500 (1966). More recent efforts have produced two important, but highly
general and purely voluntary, nonbinding international codes. 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 133-44 (2d ed. 1981). They are the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Code of Conduct for
Multinational companies, reprinted in 75 DEP-T ST. BULL. 83 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976);
and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) code on restrictive trade
practices, UN Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprinted in 963 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. G-1 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980).
8. Triggs, supra note 7, at 258. At a recent conference of developing countries,
some states objected to the development of a model antitrust code, expressing a belief that
restrictive trade practices serve as an important means of achieving goals other than those
involving free competition. Id. Conversely, American interests have traditionally avoided
international codes because of the potential of adverse effects on the freedom and profitability
of American business abroad. 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7, at 133.
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individual nation states possess a sovereign prerogative to regulate
foreign competition affecting their individual economies, 9 the absence
of an international regulatory organization capable of tempering a
"target" nation's subjective response to foreign competition has de-
prived the international community of a uniform approach to dealing
with such conflicts.'
0
Attempting to fill this void, many nations have resorted to do-
mestic laws to curb foreign restrictive trade practices." This com-
ment focuses on the United States' application of its powerful antitrust
statute, the Sherman Antitrust Act,' 2 in regulating foreign anti-com-
petitive forces, and the role of the United States' federal courts in
weighing the competing domestic and international interests in the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST ACT
Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce within its territorial boundaries and
with foreign nations. 3 In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman
9. See generally Lillich, supra note 1, at 17. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 57 (1910)(Court's opinion under the Sherman Act adopting the general
purpose and rationale of Anglo-American Common Law condemnation against restraints of
trade and monopolies).
10. Triggs, supra note 7, at 257.
11. Id. at 259. In general, the per se violations - price fixing, market allocation,
limitation of production or supply and boycotts - under U.S. antitrust laws are also illegal
in the majority of the 24 member states of the OECD. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 35,960 (2d ed. 1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (West Supp. 1982). Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years or both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
The Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976)), complements the Sherman Act by enumerating certain restrictive practices as un-
lawful, including: price, services or facilities discrimination. Federal enforcement may
provide injunctive relief, criminal prosecution or treble damages in actions brought by private
parties.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Article I, section 8 grants Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... " Id.
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Antitrust Act to deal with anti-competitive forces. 14  The Act's broad
language 5 has "precipitated dealing with international restraints of
trade judicially on a case by case basis, and therefore, much is left
to judicial discretion and to prevailing attitudes."' 16  When applying
antitrust law to foreign anticompetitive trade conduct, United States
courts concern themselves with multifarious interests:
[T]he conduct concerns more than one country and touches on the
sensitive area of sovereignty both in the country which seeks to
correct what it views as a "public injury" and in the country of
the foreign actor which regards the charge and, above all, the
order punishing or prohibiting the "injury" as infringing [upon]
its sovereignty. 17
A. Historical Background
The jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act to monopolistic
conduct outside the United States was first tested in American Banana
14. See supra note 12.
15. United States antitrust statutes tend to prohibit activities, rather than being directed
at nationals alone, thereby allowing far-reaching application. ANTITRUST AGAINST FOREIGN
ENTERPRISES 7 (C. Canenbley ed. 1981).
16. Note, The International Reach of United States Antitrust Law and the Significance
of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 149, 151 (1978). One
commentator has noted the U.S. view in the area of antitrust as:
There is a conclusive presumption in favour of competition over agreements which
eliminate competition in any way .... There is [also] a strong policy, [based on
fairness], in favour of protecting the existence, freedom and opportunities of small
business units in competing with . . . larger companies. What this has meant is
that in American Law, exemptions from competitive policy almost invariably
require legislative dispensation.
Turner, The Principles of American Antitrust Law, reprinted in 2 METZGER, LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE 1378-1383 (1966). Extraterritorial application of national antitrust
laws vary widely in this respect and it is often necessary to examine the state's attitude
towards the assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction generally when seeking an answer.
C. Canenbley, supra note 15, at 7. Antitrust differences between the U.S. and Europe are
described by Paul Nixon in a statement before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Committee on the Judiciary:
[U.S.] policy rests on the twofold presumption, well supported by the facts of
industrial experience, as your recent hearing on economic concentration have shown,
(1) that mergers of market leaders, usually do not result in social efficiencies, and
(2) competition is a regulating force to be preserved in its own right. In Europe,
in contrast, antitrust policy is one passive acquiescence in merger, the theory being
that once a firm reaches a dominant position in the market it may then be subject
to regulation. Some European anti-trust officials take the position that mergers
are imperative in order to achieve increased efficiencies, and that competition may
well be sacrificed on the altar of such alleged gains in efficiency. But then they
take a harsh view of dominant firms.
Hearings on S. 191 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monoply of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 511, 516-17 (1966)(statement of Paul Rand Nixon).
17. Barnard, Extra-territoriality and Anti-trust in the United States, reprinted in 2
METZGER, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1453 (1966).
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Co. v. United Fruit Co.18 Plaintiff Banana Company alleged that
defendant Fruit Company had effectively monopolized and restrained
the Central American banana trade with the United States by out-
bidding competitors and by persuading the Costa Rican militia to seize
plaintiff's banana plantation and railway.' 9 In denying plaintiff's
recovery, the Court applied the doctrine of "strict territoriality,"
holding that "[aill legislation is prima facie territorial''20 and that
therefore, the prohibitions of the Sherman Antitrust law did not extend
to acts done in Panama or Costa Rica. 2' Justice Holmes stated for
the Court: "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the char-
acter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done. ' ' 22 The principle of
strict territoriality was to become the United States Supreme Court's
basic approach for determining jurisdiction in foreign antitrust cases.
In asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants in subsequent
antitrust suits, the Supreme Court distinguished the facts of American
Banana, cautiously working within the strict territoriality princi-
ple.23  In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co.,24 the Court again
did not deviate from the territoriality approach, but did find that
jurisdiction existed over United States and foreign defendants who
had allegedly entered into an illegal agreement in the United States
to control passenger travel between the United States and British
Columbia. 25 In Pacific & Arctic, the government charged that the
defendants, United States and Canadian rail and steamship carriers,
had conspired in the United States to monopolize rail and steam
transportation between the United States and British Colum-
bia.26  Defendants contended that the Supreme Court lacked juris-
diction because part of the transportation route lay in Canada and
therefore, beyond the territorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 27 The Court, however, rejected the foreign defendants' juris-
diction claim:
18. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
19. Id. at 354-55.
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 356.
23. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 7, at 146 (2d ed. 1981).
24. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
26. 228 U.S. at 88-93.
27. Id. at 105.
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[lt is . . . clear that our laws cannot be extended so as to control
or affect the foreign carriage. This is but saying that laws have
no extraterritorial operation; but to apply the proposition as de-
fendants apply it would put the transportation route described in
the indictment out of the control of either Canada or the United
States. These consequences we cannot accept .... In other
words, [the combination] was a control to be exercised over trans-
portation in the United States, and, so far, is within jurisdiction
of the laws of the United States, criminal and civil.28
The Pacific & Arctic decision reinforced the Court's basic ter-
ritoriality approach although it and subsequent case law did illustrate
the subtle nuances of the meaning of territoriality. 29
B. The Alcoa Approach
The territorial approach, originally enunciated in American
Banana, was eventually reevaluated thirty-six years later in United
States v. Aluminum Company of America30 (Alcoa) by the Second
Circuit acting on certification from the Supreme Court. 3' In Alcoa,
the United States government brought suit under the Sherman Act for
dissolution of the corporate defendant's aluminum ingot monopoly,
alleging a restraint on both interstate and foreign com-
merce.32 Plaintiffs alleged that Alcoa formed a cartel (Alliance)33
with foreign companies through its Canadian subsidiary, Aluminum
Limited (Limited). 34  The district judge, however, found that Alcoa
had severed its connection with Limited in 1935, and therefore had
28. Id. at 105-06.
29. See Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U.S. at 87; American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at
347.
30. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. The Second Circuit was hearing the case on certification from the Supreme Court,
which did not have a quorum of six justices qualified to hear the case. Id. at 421.
32. Id. at 420-21.
33. The Cartel provided for the formation of a Swiss corporation, pursuant to an
agreement entered into on July 3, 1931, by two German corporations, one French corporation,
a Swiss corporation, a British corporation, and Limited, a Canadian corporation. The
Corporation issued shares to each of its members and was to periodically fix production
quotas for each share to each of its members and was to periodically fix production of
aluminum by the number of shares it held. "No shareholder was to 'buy, borrow, fabricate,
or sell' aluminum produced by anyone not a shareholder except with the consent of the
board of governors .... " Id. at 442. The Court found, however, that the production
quotas did not include imports to the United States, but did find that the Cartel's Agreement
of 1936, which substituted a system of royalties for the production quotas, was to affect
aluminum exports to the United States. Id. at 442-44.
34. Id. at 440.
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not participated in the alleged foreign restrictive conduct. 35 While
these findings were not disturbed by the court of appeals, 36 Judge
Learned Hand was still left with the question of whether Limited itself
had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 37  The legality of the foreign
agreement depended on "whether Congress chose to attach liability
to the conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance
to it." '38 The court's analysis of congressional intent necessarily
included a recognition of the:
Limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of
their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed
by the "Conflict of Laws. ... 39 [The Court] should not impute
to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for
conduct which has no consequences within the United States.40
With this limitation in mind, the court stated that "it is settled
law. . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these li-
abilities other states will ordinarily recognize.' '41 Stating that "inter-
national complications were likely to arise" if activity abroad producing
"consequences" within the United States were treated as per se un-
lawful, Judge Hand concluded that the Sherman Act reprehended only
those acts possessing both an intent to produce an effect, and an actual
effect on United States commerce:4 2
35. Id. at 441.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 442.
38. Id. at 443.
39. Id. The court was referring to RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934):
EVENTS CONSEQUENT ON ACTS DONE IN ANOTHER STATE. If con-
sequences of an act done in one state occur in another state, each state in which
any event in the series of act and consequences occurs may exercise legislative
jurisdiction to create rights or other interests as a result thereof.
Compare Section 65 with the ALI's revised provision in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 37 (1971):
Causing Effects in State by Act Done Elsewhere. A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with
respect to any cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and
of the individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
40. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (citing American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 357).
41. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85
(19 10)(habeas corpus proceeding in extradition)). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 65 (1934).
42. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
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[W]e shall assume that the Act does not cover agreements, even
though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its perform-
ance is shown actually to have had some effect upon them. Where
both conditions are satisfied [intent and effect], the situation cer-
tainly falls within such decisions as [Pacific & Arctic, Thomsen,
and Sisal43 ] .4
Applying this two part test, Judge Hand concluded that Limited had
violated the Sherman Act. The requisite intent was satisfied by the
Alliance agreement's 1936 amendment which was "deliberate and
. . . expressly made to accomplish [an effect on United States im-
ports]. "45 Further, once the intent to affect imports was proven, the
burden of proof shifted to Limited to show no resulting actual effect
on United States imports. 46  Limited's inability to rebut this pre-
sumption was decisive in finding a violation of the Sherman Act.47
Judge Hand's approach to the extraterritoriality analysis under
the Sherman Act was treated as authoritative, although the Supreme
Court has left lower federal courts to explain and apply the Alcoa
test. 48  Subsequent case law produced few serious challenges to
Alcoa's approach with distinctions being confined within the test's
overall framework. 49 Thirty-five years passed before perceived de-
ficiencies with Alcoa5° - primarily with the "effects" component of
the two-part test - inspired the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to
formulate a new approach.
43. Pacific & Arctic, 228 U.S. at 87; Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1916); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). The Court noted that in those cases,
agents had been sent into the United States by the guilty parties to perform part of the illegal
act, but held those agents to be a mere "animate means of executing his principal's pur-
poses." Thus, Alcoa's factual difference did not distinguish those cases. Alcoa, 148 F.2d
at 444.
44. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
45. Id. The Court's "deliberate" and "express" language coupled with its concern
for international complications suggests that the intent to affect United States commerce be
specific in nature. Id. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Cartel
Agreement).
46. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
47. Id. at 444-45.
48. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7, at 151.
49. Id.
50. "The State Department's Legal Advisor reported in 1959 that 'there are a number
of friendly foreign governments, foreign officials, and even foreign courts, which believe
strongly - or even passionately, I may say - that [Alcoa and similar cases constitute] a
violation and infringement' of international law and sovereignty:" I J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, supra note 7, at 157 n.84 (citing Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations With
Foreign Nations, 40 DEPT ST. BULL. 272-73 (1959).
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C. The Timberlane Approach
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,5" plaintiffs al-
leged that certain Bank officials and others residing both in the United
States and Honduras conspired to prevent Timberlane, an Oregon
partnership, from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the
United States through its Honduran subsidiaries. As a result, dom-
ination of the Honduran lumber export business remained in exclusive
control of select individuals financed and controlled by the Bank.
The conspiracy allegedly interfered with the exportation of Honduran
lumber to the United States and Puerto Rico for sale or use by the
plaintiffs, thereby directly and substantially affecting the foreign com-
merce of the United States. 52
The district court dismissed the action, reasoning that the act of
state doctrine 53 prohibited the court from examining the acts of a
foreign sovereign and, further, that the court lacked jurisdiction in
the absence of a direct and substantial effect on United States foreign
commerce .54 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court. Because the judicial proceedings were initiated by private
parties and not be the Honduran government, and because the court's
action did not reflect sovereign policy, the circuit court concluded
that the judgments did not consitute acts of state. 55  Resolution of
the jurisdictional question, however, was not as easy. Judge Choy
expressed an unwillingness to rely on the precedent set by Alcoa,
citing its failure to ensure a comity analysis in its approach to extra-
51. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc
Mar. 3, 1977.
52. Id. at 601.
53. The United States Supreme Court explained the act of state doctrine in Underhill
v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
The doctrine derives from the judiciary's concern for its possible interference with the conduct
of foreign affairs by the political branches of the United States Government. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1963).
54. 549 F.2d at 601. The district court was vague in stating the basis of the dismissal.
Id. The circuit court treated the basis of the dismissal as a failure to state a claim and
found that dismissal without allowing discovery was improper under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
and 56(e). 549 F.2d at 601-03.
55. 549 F.2d at 608.
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territorial jurisdiction: 56
The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider
other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into account
the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country. Whether the alleged offender is an American citizen,
for instance, may make a big difference; applying American laws
to American citizens raises fewer problems than application to
foreigners.
American courts have, in fact, often displayed a regard for
comity and the prerogatives of other nations and considered their
interests as well as other parts of the factual circumstances, even
when professing to apply an effects test. To some degree, the
requirement for a "substantial" effect may silently incorporate
these additional considerations, with "substantial" as a flexible
standard that varies with other factors. The intent requirement
suggested by Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44, is one example of an
attempt to broaden the court's perspective, as is drawing a dis-
tinction between American citizens and noncitizens.
The failure to articulate these other elements in addition to
the standard effects analysis is costly, however, for it is more
likely that they will be overlooked or slighted in interpreting past
decisions and reaching new ones. 57
Recognizing that "at some point the interests of the United States
are too weak .. . to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdic-
tion," 5 the court enunciated the tripartite "jurisdictional rule of rea-
son" test:
59
[First,] [d]oes the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to
affect, the foreign commerce of the United States? [Second,]
[i]s it of such type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act? [Third], [a]s a matter of inter-
national comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the United States be asserted to cover it?-
The tripartite test manifests an intent to refrain from undue reliance
on the substantiality test and to embrace considerations of international
56. Id. at 612.
57. Id. at 611-12 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 609.
59. Id. at 613-15. See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
446 (1958).
60. 549 F.2d at 615 (footnote omitted).
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fairness and comity in the determination of jurisdiction.6I As with
the act of state doctrine, the court desired to express a similar aware-
ness of the possible foreign implications of its extraterritorial ac-
tions.62 Thus, the court will balance the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy 63 and then determine whether the contacts and
interests of the United States are sufficient to support the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.6 The Timberlane court remanded to the
district court with instructions to balance and reconsider the exercise
of jurisdiction in light of these factors.65
The Timberlane court's jurisdictional formulation of de-empha-
sizing the effects test in favor of a more complex and multilevel comity
analysis was well received in the United States.66 The Third Circuit
adopted a similar approach in Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp. ,67 although using a slightly different list of factors
61. Id. at 613.
62. Id.
63. The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect,
and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these factors should
identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted. A
difference in law or policy is one likely sore spot. though one which may not
always be present. Nationality is another; though foreign governments may have
some concern for the treatment of American citizens and business residing there,
they primarily care about their own nationals.
Id. at 614.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40, which considers the following factors relevant in the balancing process:
(a) vital national interest of each of the states;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person:
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state:
(d) the nationality of the person: and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can be reasonably
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
64. 549 F.2d at 614-15.
65. Id. It is interesting to note that in April 1982 (more than five years after remand
from the court of appeals) the district court appointed a special master to hear the jurisdictional
issue. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, No. C 73 0792 SW (N.D. Cal. Apr.
5. 1982) noted in 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 808 (1982).
66. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7. at 162.
67. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have now also
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in the balancing process 68 and indicating a preference for retaining
Alcoa standards for the threshold effects determination.69 This pref-
erence, however, illustrates a major difference in the plaintiff's burden
of proof under the two approaches.70 Under Timberlane, as long as
there was some effect on United States commerce, and a valid claim
alleged under the Sherman Act, the court would proceed to the critical
balancing process. 7 Mannington, however, would seemingly re-
quire a showing of "substantial" effects at the initial stage of inquiry
before the balancing process would be applied.
72
National and especially foreign criticism of Timberlane has fo-
cused on the possibility that restraints having only minor effects on
United States commerce will be litigated in American courts:
If the plaintiff does not have to prove significant effects at stage
one of the process and if, as is likely, a large quantum of proof
will not be required to satisfy the threshold standard in any event,
the result will be that even cases in which the United States has
only a trivial interest will survive the first stage and move on to
the balancing stage, where costly discovery and lengthy proceed-
ings may be necessary. 71
accepted the basic Timberlane line of analysis. See Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S.
Ct. 1244 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc.. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981). cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
68. The Third Circuit relied on the following in the balancing analysis:
I. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there:
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by
both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances; and
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d at 1297-98.
69. 595 F.2d at 1291-92.
70. i J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7, at 167.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 167-68.
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Emphasis on the comity analysis has done little to appease foreign
criticism of the extraordinary reach of United States antitrust laws
74
and several foreign states have rejected the balancing test as a violation
of their sovereignty. 75  Others have felt compelled to enact general
blocking statutes. 76  The catalyst for much of the foreign criticism
was the complex and multi-defendant case of In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation (Uranium)77 which represented the first real opportunity for
a United States court to test the effectiveness of the as yet unproven
comity test.
We have considerable apprehension about the Timberlane decision
... I suppose everybody else here is too polite to ask how it is
that a judge of a Canadian court or of an American court can
decide what is the proper balance of international interest, the
interests, for example, of Canada in the exploitation of its natural
resources and the interests of [the U.S.] in the maintenance of
competition. I feel that this is not a good area for the judiciary.
D. The Balancing Process in Operation:
the Uranium Experience
In Uranium,7 plaintiff-appellee Westinghouse Electric Corpo-
ration brought suit against twenty-nine foreign and domestic uranium
producers, alleging Sherman antitrust violations and a conspiracy to
fix the price of uranium in the world market. 79  The facts surrounding
plaintiff's allegations and the appearance of several foreign govern-
74. Comment, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extra-
territoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213, 226 (1982).
75. Blair, The Canadian Experience, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 67 (J. Griffin ed. 1979):
76. See Commonwealth Nations Adopt Resolution Criticizing U.S. Treble Damage
Judgments, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963f, at A-10 (May 8,
1980); Foreign Resentment Over Extraterritorial Enforcement is Growing, Conference is
Told, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 993, at A-7 (Dec. I1, 1980).
For a thorough comparison of various foreign blocking statutes enacted in response to the
extraordinary reach of U.S. antitrust laws, see Comment, supra note 74, at Appendix I.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-105.
78. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). This
litigation was settled for the most part in late 1981. I J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra
note 7, at Supp. 31.
79. 473 F. Supp. at 382.
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ments as amici curiae80 on behalf of the foreign defendants suggested
that evaluation of the court's jurisdiction would be proper under the
Timberlane and Manninglon Mills balancing tests.81 Amici's argu-
ment for a comity analysis was based on several factors. First, the
bulk of the challenged conduct had occurred abroad and had govern-
mental approval because the conduct related to the mining and de-
velopment of natural resouces important to those coun-
tries. 82 Second, the uranium cartel's alleged price fixing was merely
a defensive reaction to a United States import embargo on foreign-
source uranium into the United States. 83  Finally, the cartel was in-
tended to mitigate price declines in non-American markets caused by
the United States ban, and therefore the requisite intent to affect United
States commerce and the substantial effect on that commerce were
absent. 84 The prospects for judicially deciding the comity issues,
however, were hindered when nine of the properly served defendants
elected not to appear.8 5 Their failure to respond angered the court,
and on January 3, 1979, the district court granted Westinghouse's
motion for entry of final default judgments against the defaulting
defendants.8 6 Judge Marshall's decision did not address the ques-
80. The governments of Australia, Canada, South Africa, Great Britain and Northern
Ireland filed briefs as amici curiae. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248,
1253 (7th Cir. 1980). Under current practice, the Departments of Justice and State encourage
foreign governments to present their views to the American courts as amici. See Letter from
Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the State Department to John H. Shenefield, Associate
Attorney General (March 17, 1980), reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 665-67 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Letter from Roberts Owen to John Shenefield].
81. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 7, at 170-71.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id.
84. Id. Further concerns were voiced by amici arising out of their involvement in
developing "and or implementing official policies concerning uranium marketing which they
deemed consistent with their national interest and which [were] now being challenged, not
through diplomatic channels, but through private damage litigation in a U.S. court." Letter
from Roberts Owen to John Shenefield, supra note 80, at 665-66.
85. Four Australian companies were in default: Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia,
Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium, Ltd., Pancontinental Mining, Ltd., and Queensland Mines,
Ltd. Two British companies were in default: Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. and RTZ Services,
Ltd. Two South African companies were in default: Nuclear Fuels Corp. and Anglo-
American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. One Canadian corporation was in default: Rio
Algom, Ltd. 473 F. Supp. at 385, n.I.
86. Westinghouse's motion for entry of final default judgment was granted pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Id. at 390. District Judge Marshall stated that he was granting
the default judgment in recognition of its significance as a "procedural tool for enforcing
compliance with rules of procedure, see [FED. R. Civ. P.] 37(d) . . . and for disciplining
the obstructionist adversary who willfully ignores the processes of the court." Id.
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tions of jurisdiction or comity, but instead focused on the complexity
of the litigation, protecting the plaintiff's ability to secure a writ of
execution to collect any subsequent damages,8 7 the seriousness of the
plaintiff's charges and the foreign defendant's recalcitrant attitude. 88
On interlocutory appeal of Judge Marshall's default order, amici
again appeared, arguing for remand to the district court on the question
of whether subject matter jurisdiction was being properly exercised
in light of comity considerations.8 9 After considering this argument,
the court of appeals refused to to remand the case. 90  Concluding that
Westinghouse's allegations of concerted conduct by the defendants
were sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Alcoa's effects test, 91 the
appellate court disposed of amici's comity argument by stating that
such factors were discretionary and pertinent only after the district
judge had determined that jurisdiction was proper. 92  The court gave
two grounds for holding that Judge Marshall had not abused his
discretion by refusing to consider the Mannington Mills comity factors:93
First, the Mannington Mills factors are not the law of this circuit.
Second, even assuming their adoption by this Court, the circum-
stances here are distinct from those found in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills. In those cases the defendants appeared and
contested the jurisdiction of the District Court. In the present
case, the defaulters have contumaciously refused to come into
court and present evidence as to why the District Court should
not exercise its jurisdiction . . . . If this Court were to remand
the matter for further consideration of the jurisdiction question,
the District Court would be placed in the impossible position of
having to make specific findings with the defaulters refusing to
appear and participate in discovery. We find little value in such
an exercise.
94
87. The district court entered three injunctions against Atlas Alloys and one against
Rio Algom enjoining the transfer of funds from the United States. These events are described
in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1251 (interlocutory appeal of Judge
Marshall's order granting the default judgments).
88. 473 F. Supp. at 390.
89. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 7, at 171.
90. 617 F.2d at 1255-56.
91. Id. at 1254.
92. Id. at 1255.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1255-56.
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E. Implications of the Uranium Litigation
Recent commentary95 suggests that, at a minimum, the Uranium
experience indicates that sensible use of the comity balancing test is
effectively undermined when foreign defendants fail to appear.
96  It
also raises the broader question of whether United States' courts can
properly balance vital American and foreign national interests. Judge
Marshall describes the difficulty:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps
even authority, to evaluate the economic and social policies of a
foreign country, such a balancing test is inherently unworkable in
this case. The competing interests here display an irreconcilable
conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy.
97
The competing interests referred to were Westinghouse's attempt
to secure foreign documents through the discovery process to pros-
ecute its private antitrust action and the responding blocking legislation
enacted by three foreign governments:
Westinghouse seeks to enforce this nation's antitrust laws against
an alleged international marketing arrangement among uranium
producers, and to that end has sought documents located in foreign
countries where those producers conduct their business. In spe-
cific response to this and other related litigation in the American
courts, three foreign governments have enacted nondiclosure leg-
islation which is aimed at nullifying the impact of American an-
titrust legislation by prohibiting access to those same documents.
It is simply impossible to judicially "balance" these totally con-
tradictory and mutually negating actions. 98
While Uranium's failure to test the benefits and evenhandedness
of the comity tests of Timberlane and Mannington Mills proved dis-
appointing," it illustrated the difficulty courts face in balancing the
various relevant interests. Criticism of the balancing process extends
from a court's overreliance on international comity principles'o° to its
95. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7, at 173.
96. Id.
97. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. 111. 1979).
98. Id. See also Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Prog-
ress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 315 (1982).
99. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. supra note 7, at 180.
100. "[Declining] extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction on grounds of international com-
ity is an abuse of judicial equity power." Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial
Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 428 (1983).
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underreliance on such factors.10 1 A more fundamental problem with
the balancing process is its feasibility and manageability. Providing
a court with a "list of factors and an instruction to consider and weigh
them do no provide much guidance about the character of the balancing
process."10 2  The court in Mannington Mills, for example, required
a separate balancing analysis for each of the twenty-six foreign coun-
tries involved. 10 3  Such ambitious undertakings will inevitably re-
quire the extensive "over-discovery" complained of by foreign
governments' °4 and result in protracted, expensive and unmanageable
litigation. 105
III. ENFORCING ANTITRUST STATUTES IN THE FUTURE
United States antitrust statutes apply to markets outside the United
States. 10 6  American business' interest in maintaining free competi-
tion in domestic and foreign markets is responsible for much of the
United States antitrust legislation, as well as the extraterritorial prob-
lems that have arisen in enforcing those laws beyond national geo-
graphic limits. United States courts have interpreted the statutory
language of the Sherman Antitrust Act in conjunction with the Clayton
Act as conferring jurisdiction over conduct outside the United States
by non-nationals whose actions cause effects within the United States
which are direct and substantial. 107  Recent courts have also recog-
nized the significance of a comity analysis. 108  The problem that has
arisen concerns the extent to which the comity analysis affects a court's
determination of jurisdiction. The Uranium experience illustrates the
global impact of United States antitrust litigation: the number of
named defendants; 1°9 the time involved in pursuing, and potential
101. "The . . . [balancing] approach may have even lowered the threshold 'effects'
requisite." Kestenbaum, supra note 98, at 336.
102. Id. at 335-36.
103. 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
105. Compare supra note 65.
106. Debate, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law (Economic Imperialism
or Protecting Competition Against Foreign Invasion?), 50 ANTITRUST L. J. 617, 630 (1981)
(statement by James A. Rahl).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 32-51.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 52-77.
109. Westinghouse Electric Corporation named twelve foreign and seventeen domestic
corporations in its antitrust suit. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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recovery for enormous treble damage awards;" 0 and the adverse ef-
fects on foreign relations."' It signifies the need for an objective,
uniform standard for determining jurisdictional questions. Continued
trust in the courts' ability to deal with sensitive and everchanging
foreign relations concerns and to gradually fill in its hazy contours
imposes an undue burden on the courts.1 2  Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral William F. Baxter has recognized that burdening the courts with
a "long list of factors" is simply an open invitation for the court to
decide for themselves. "13
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal courts belong in the process of maintianing competitive
and open world markets. A jurisdictional test based on intent and
effects in conjunction with the comity analysis allows the judiciary
to enforce American antitrust laws in appropriate cases. However,
as discussed, the courts' effective participation in this process is ham-
pered by a multivariable comity analysis which often requires a bal-
ancing of factors which are beyond judicial expertise.
Congressional initiative coupled with executive foreign policy
objectives is needed to formulate additional objective and uniform
guidelines for the judiciary's responsible use of the comity analysis.
With limited exception,' 4 however, such direction has been slow in
coming. Such action is essential for effective, long term enforcement
of American antitrust laws. Until further direction is forthcoming,
110. The total amount of damages sought by Westinghouse was estimated at $6-7
billion. 457 AuST. PARL. DEB. 2186 (18 Nov. 1976) (statement of Sen. P. Durack). Much
of the litigation was mercifully settled in late 1981, five years after Westinghouse had filed
its complaint. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 7, at Supp. 31.
111. The court's reaction to the amici and their role in the comity analysis was so
critical and antagonistic that Roberts B. Owen, Legal Advisor of the Department of State,
asked John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, to notify the court of the concern it
had caused the United States Government and to "take into account appropriate considerations
of comity where there is a possible conflict between the laws or policies of nation
states." Letter from John H. Shenefield, Department of Justice, to Judge Prentice H.
Marshall, District Judge, United States District Court, N.D. Ill., reprinted in [Transfer Binder
Current Comment 1969-83] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50, 416.
112. Kestenbaum, supra note 98, at 336.
113. W. Baxter, "Antitrust in an Interdependent World," Remarks Before the ABA
Section of International Law, the International Trade Committee of the ABA Section of
Antitrust, the Japan Society, the International Division of the D.C. Bar, and the International
Law Institute of the Georgetown University Center (Sept. 29, 1981), reprinted in CURRENT
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 13, 18 (J. Griffin ed. 1981).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 118-22.
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the broad balancing analysis would be best used by federal judges as
a discretionary jurisdictional test."I5 A discretionary approach pro-
vides a court with much needed flexibility in dealing with complex,
multiple party antitrust suits.
Consideration of the comity factors in light of preexisting juris-
diction to determine whether exercising that jurisdiction is appropriate
provides wary courts with a legitimate means of postponing adjudi-
cation of complex cases. Similar to the political question doctrine," 6
the discretionary jurisdictional comity test could be the basis of the
case's dismissal, or in close cases, abstention pending administrative
review of the court's comity findings. Extension of the political
question doctrine to abstention situations would accomplish two major
goals. First, it would encourage executive intervention by the State
and Justice Departments in the resolution of sensitive foreign policy
matters. Second, the danger of ad hoc, multifarious precedent among
the circuits would be minimized by administrative review of a court's
comity findings, an executive function that serves as a prime example
of the necessity for long range executive action and which may already
exist through intergovernmental agreement." 7
The recently concluded agreement between the United States and
Australia exemplifies action by both governments to cooperate in
antitrust matters." 8 A product of the Uranium debacle, this agree-
ment essentially established a dialogue between the two countries with
respect to antitrust matters. As a significant part of that dialogue,
the United States committed itself to apprising courts entertaining
private antitrust suits of that intergovernmental agreement when re-
quested by the Australian government.'9
On the legislative side, recent congressional initiative has pro-
duced the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
115. But see Industrial Inv. Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). In Mitsui, Judge Reavley
stated that the balancing test presented a question of law, not one of discretion - fully
reviewable on appeal. Id. at 884-85 n.7. He rejected -the suggestion in Timberlane, de-
veloped more fully in Uranium, that once a district judge has determined that jurisdiction
exists, he should then consider the comity factors to determine whether exercise of that
jurisdiction is appropriate. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1255.
116. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
117. See infra notes 118-19.
118. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, United States-Australia,
June 29, 1982, reprinted in [1969-83 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,440.
119. Id. art. 6.
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(Act).120 While the Act does not affect "the courts ability to employ
notions of comity,"1 121 it does provide a special statutory standard of
subject matter jurisdiction in foreign commerce situations. The Act
requires a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
United States domestic or import commerce or on an export trader
located in the United States. 122 Although judicial construction of the
statute is still forthcoming, its enactment recognizes the need for
clarification of jurisdictional issues and its wording suggests that a
"court's ability to employ notions of comity" is discretionary in
nature and proper only after an initial finding of jurisdiction based
on the intent and effects test.
Judicial uniformity and consistency in the enforcement of United
States antitrust laws is in the best interest not only of private litigants,
but also of the Executive Branch, whose foreign policy decision-
making should not include ameliorating the decisions of well-meaning
but unversed federal judges. Clarification of the comity test's foreign
policy component is an Executive and Legislative function, and the
Judiciary should only follow their lead.
Kurt A. Didier
120. Pub. L. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246.
121. H. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
122. See supra note 120, at § 403.
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